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SYSTEM OF
ELECTIONS
It will be evident from the foregoing
chapters that the system of elections advocated in this
Constitution is direct for the village panchayats and indirect
for the taluka, district, province and the All-India panchayats.
This system will combine the chief advantages of both direct and
indirect elections. The election will be direct in the village
that would enjoy maximum local autonomy. Since the functions of
the higher bodies will be mainly advisory and coordinative,
indirect election would be the most suitable method. It will
avoid colossal waste of national energy, time and money involved
in direct elections especially in a vast country like India. The
unhealthy growth of political parties and communal feelings will
also be automatically checked to a great extent. Since indirect
elections will be confined to a few responsible individuals,
there will be hardly any room for bribery and corruption.
Besides, the representatives of the upper bodies will not be in
a position to ‘forget’ their constituencies because they
would owe their delegation to the lower panchayats. According to
the proposed Constitution, the president of the lower panchayat
shall be the ex officio member of the next higher panchayat.
Thus, even the president of the All-India panchayat shall be the
president of his own village panchayat as well; he shall, at the
same time, be a member or president of the taluka, district and
provincial panchayats. He will, therefore, be fully conversant
with and alive to the difficulties and requirements of the
masses; he cannot be a mere ‘armchair’ politician. If any
member of the highest body does not discharge his civil duties
towards the people satisfactorily, he would stand no chance at
the next elections; he might even be ‘recalled’ by his own
village panchayat, thus, compelling him to resign his membership
of all the other higher bodies. Since the village constituencies
will be small and there will be direct and intimate knowledge of
the candidates seeking election, the scope for electioneering
frauds would be eliminated root and branch.
10.1 Franchise
The question of franchise
and electoral qualifications will arise only in the case of
elections for the village panchayats. In the villages, elections
will be on the basis of adult franchise irrespective of any
distinctions relating to caste, creed, sex, religion,
socio-economic position or education. Even literacy shall not be
compulsory qualification for a voter. Observes Gandhiji:
"I cannot possibly bear the idea that a man who has got
wealth should have the vote, but the man who has got character
but no wealth or literacy should have no vote.
Or that a man who works honestly by the sweat of his brow, day
in and day out, should not have the vote for the crime of
being a poor man. I am not enamoured of the doctrine of
literacy, that voter must at least have knowledge of the three
R’s. I want for my people to have knowledge of the three R’s,
but I know also that if I have to wait until they have got a
knowledge of the three R’s before they can be qualified for
voting, I shall have to wait until the Greek Kalends. And I am
not prepared to wait all that time."1
10.2 Special Qualifications
Although no rigid rules could be framed for
the members and office bearers of the panchayats, the following
special merits shall weigh with the voters while casting votes
in favour of different candidates:
a. Literacy and general education;
b. Mature experience of civic life;
c. Financial independence (to eliminate
chances of corruption);
d. Record of solid and selfless service to
the village community.
In this context, any kind of canvassing in
elections should be regarded as a disqualification. Membership
of the panchayat should be looked upon as a grave responsibility
and not as a matter of mere honour and selfish gains.
It is thus clear that the Westminster
parliamentry system with a mixed up executive and legislature is
fundamentally faulty. It
is functioning satisfactorily in a small homogeneous country
such a Britain, but created serious problems of stability in
many countries including France and Sri Lanka. The German
variation in which a vote of no confidence against a government
has to be accompanied by a vote of confidence for another
government, is a poor compromise. In a large country with
multiple interests such as India, it is likely to create serious
problems of horsetrading and other types of abuse of power.
For India, Gandhi had rightly and strongly
proposed separation of executive and legislature along with
exclusive juridictions at the local, state and national levels.
This will allow full expression of local aspirations at the
local level, while the national chief executive will look after
the defence of the nation and other national level issues. This
would be the only sound system, not only for India, but also for
most nations.
Election System
The gram sabhas or village parliaments will
elect their sarpanchs and panchs through secret ballot for one
year, and can remove a sarpanch or panch any time for misconduct
and elect another in his or her place. Except when serious
malpractice is apprehended, the elections should be conducted
under the supervision of the village parliament assisted by
village officials. Urban neighbourhoods can similarly elect
their chairpersons and members.
The sub-district and sub-city governments
should have directly elected chief executives as chairpersons
and members elected or nominated by the gram sabhas and urban
neighbourhoods. Their prime function will be coordination and
resolving difficulties of grassroots governments.
The district, city, state and national
governments should have directly elected chief executives and
deputy chief executives elected as a team, and separate watchdog
elected bodies consisting of councillors or legislators. A chief
executive will appoint his or her team of executives who
shall not be councillors or legislators but whose
appointment will require the approval of the concerned elected
body. An appropriate procedure for impeachment of a chief
executive should be provided. Required details can be worked
out.
It should be mandatory for recognised
political parties with reserved symbols to hold intra-party
primary elections for all elective positions at the district,
city, state and national levels.
Since councillors and legislators will
perform only watchdog functions, there is no need for
complicated practises such as transferable votes or listing
system. There should be no reservations for any elective
position as it violates the fundamentals of democracy. It should
be the responsibility of local governments to ensure that the
disadvantaged communities get fully integrated in the society.
In this, multi-stakeholder upper houses described below can play
a vital role.
Multi-stakeholder Upper Houses
The Rajya Sabha, modelled on the British
House of Lords, is a recluse for retired politicians. It is
serving little purpose. Based on the recommendations of the Rio
Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992,
Multi-stakeholder Upper Houses should be instituted at local,
state and national levels to resolve conflicts and moderate
decision-making for sustainability. They should consist of
representatives of various interest groups, such as
disadvantaged communities, farmers, labour, industry, women,
religions, NGOs and professionals, elected or selected through
independent processes as may be decided in each category.
Such upper houses at the sub-district or
sub-city level will try to resolve social and environmental
conflicts at the grassroots level. If they are unable to do so,
there can be a second appeal to the upper house at district or
city level but no further. The state and national governments
should have no jurisdiction in such matters since higher level
politics tends to abuse them for creating vote banks.
These concepts can be further studied and
refined.
—- PEOPLE FIRST
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